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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20000233-SC 
v. : 
DARRYL HUBBARD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated 
burglary, both first degree felonies, and aggravated assault, a third degree felony. This 
Court has jurisdiction over appeals from convictions for first degree felonies pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in excluding expert lecture testimony on eyewitness 
identification where the substance of that testimony was conveyed to the jury 
through a Long instruction? 
A trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, % 43, 425 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8. An appellate court "can properly find abuse only if... no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id. at f 28. 
II. Was the photo lineup impermissibly suggestive where the trial court found 
that five of the six photographs were consistent with the victims' description 
of the perpetrator and the presenting officer did nothing to draw the victims' 
attention to defendant?1 
In reviewing a ruling on the suggestiveness of a photo lineup, this Court reviews 
the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and reviews its conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
III. Was the eyewitness identification testimony properly admitted under 
Ramirez where each witness clearly saw defendant on the date of the 
crime and never wavered from their descriptions thereafter? 
Because defendant invited any error in the admission of the witnesses' 
identification testimony, no standard of review applies. 
IV. Did defendant waive his right to be present at sidebar conferences in which 
the court and counsel questioned individual jurors off the record where 
defendant did nothing to assert his right at the time? 
Because defendant did not raise this challenge below, it is reviewed only for plain 
error. To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred; 
(2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) defendant would have 
obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah 1993). 
lIn his brief, defendant addresses both his state and federal constitutional 
challenges to the eyewitness testimony in Point II. For ease of argument, the State 
separates defendant's claims, addressing his federal claim in Point H and his state claim 
in Point III. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated robbery, aggravated 
burglary, theft, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and two counts 
of aggravated assault (R. 22-25). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over 
on the aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft counts and on one count of 
aggravated assault (R. 227:62-63). The theft count was later dismissed (Cf. R. 148-49). 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress eyewitness identification 
testimony (R. 43-45). That motion as well as defendant's motion to allow expert 
eyewitness identification testimony were denied (R. 59-60, 62, 82-94, 132-34). 
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery, aggravated 
burglary, and aggravated assault (R. 191-94). He was sentenced to five-years-to-life for 
his aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary convictions, and one-to-five years for his 
aggravated assault conviction (R. 199-200). He received a consecutive term of one-to-
five years for use of a dangerous weapon during the aggravated robbery (R. 194, 200). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 203). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 24, 1999, defendant knocked on an apartment door in North Salt Lake. 
When Jeff Gunderson opened the door, defendant forced himself in, shot a hole in 
Gunderson's leg, and then held Gunderson, his girlfriend, and three friends at gunpoint as 
he collected money, a gun, a knife, several ounces of marijuana, and various other items 
from Gunderson's apartment. 
Jeff Gunderson was hanging out with three friends smoking pot in his basement 
apartment living room when he heard a knock on the door (R. 229:80, 81, 101, 114, 120, 
129, 130). Jeff asked who was there, and defendant identified himself as "Sixty-nine" (R. 
229:115, 131). As Jeff opened the door, the stranger began to enter (R. 229:131-32). 
When Jeff put his hand to defendant's chest to try to stop him, defendant pulled out a 
small semiautomatic gun and shot Jeff in the leg, causing him to fall (R. 229:116, 131-
32). The bullet ripped a hole in Jeffs left leg between his ankle and knee (R. 229:131-
32). Blood gushed from the wound (R. 229:131-32). 
Defendant then stuck the gun in Jeffs face, pulled him up by his hair and told him 
he knew there were two safes, two guns, drugs and cash in the apartment, and that he 
wanted it all (R. 229:85,133). Meanwhile, Jeffs friend Mike had hidden himself and 
was trying to load Jeffs pistol grip shotgun (R. 229:89, 117, 136). Jeffs friends Ayza 
and Travis were also trying to hide (R. 229:85, 117, 135-36). Jeffs girlfriend, Cheryl, 
4 
who had been listening to music in the bedroom, heard the gun shot, grabbed a knife, and 
came out into the living room (R. 229:81, 134). 
As soon as he noticed her, defendant pointed his gun at Cheryl and told her to drop 
the knife (R. 229:84, 88, 133). Defendant then ordered her to lay on the kitchen floor and 
duct-taped her arms behind her back (R. 229:88-89, 135). Defendant stuffed the knife in 
his pocket (R. 229:91). 
Defendant then demanded Jeffs wallet (R. 229:90). Jeff threw his wallet to the 
ground (R. 229:90). Defendant picked up the wallet and took out all the money ($500-
$800) (R. 229:90, 138, 159). He then ordered Jeff and Cheryl back into the living room 
(R. 229:91). Along the way, defendant took the shotgun from Mike, as well as a 
calculator and pocket knife from off the kitchen table (R. 229:91). 
Defendant then demanded to know where the safes were (R. 229:136). Jeff told 
him the safe was in the front room but had nothing important in it (R. 229:136). 
Defendant ordered Cheryl to get that safe and Jeff to open it (R. 229:91-92). Defendant 
took the approximately four grams of marijuana and $100 cash inside (R. 229:138, 159). 
Defendant then grabbed Jeffs hair again and, demanding to see the other safe, 
dragged Jeff to the back bedroom and ordered him to sit on the bed (R. 229:92, 139). 
Defendant then left the room (R. 229:139). After a few minutes, Jeff hobbled back to the 
living room (R. 229:139). Defendant had fled (R. 229:95, 139). Jeff tried to go after 
defendant but collapsed at the door (R. 229:95, 141). Cheryl then called 911 (R. 229:95). 
5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court did not err in excluding defendant's expert witness where 
his testimony would have merely constituted a lecture to the jury, and the trial court gave 
a comprehensive Long jury instruction that addressed the reliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony. 
Point II. Defendant's claim that the photo lineup was impermissibly suggestive 
fails because defendant reargues the facts but neither addresses the trial court's factual 
findings nor marshals the evidence that supports them. 
Moreover, a photo lineup in which five of the six photos match the description 
given by the witnesses and the presenter does nothing to focus attention on defendant's 
photo is not impermissibly suggestive. 
Point III. Defendant's challenge to the eyewitness identification testimony under 
the Utah constitution fails because it was consciously abandoned below. 
In any case, the claim fails because, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identifications were reliable. 
Point IV. Defendant waived his right to be present at the sidebar jury voir dire by 
failing to exercise it. Moreover, defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced 
by his absence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. EXCLUSION OF AN EXPERT'S LECTURE TESTIMONY WAS 
NOT IMPROPER WHERE A LONG INSTRUCTION, CROSS-
EXAMINATION, AND ARGUMENT PROVIDED DEFENDANT 
WITH ADEQUATE MEANS BY WHICH TO CHALLENGE 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert 
testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. Aplt. Br. at 25. This Court's 
recent decision in State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, is dispositive. 
"Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness 
identification should be allowed is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. at 
f 43. Moreover, "the exercise of discretion . . . necessarily reflects the personal 
judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if.. . no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id. at ^ 28. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Before trial, defendant filed a notice of intent to call Dr. David Dodd as an expert 
on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications (R. 63-65). In his 
supporting memorandum, defendant explained that the expert testimony "pertains to 
research and theory concerning memory, the reporting of memory, and the variables 
known to influence memory and memory reports" (R. 83). The purpose of the testimony 
was to "outline for the jury the general principles of psychological knowledge which 
illuminate the problems of eyewitness performance" (R. 94). At a hearing on the matter, 
7 
defendant reaffirmed that the purpose was to "properly educate the jury . . . on mistakes 
that can be made in eyewitness identification" (R. 240:15). At no time did defendant 
indicate that his expert had any knowledge of the facts of this case or of the witnesses 
involved.2 The State opposed the expert testimony (R. 74-79). 
After argument, the trial court excluded Dr. Dodd's testimony, ruling: 
[The] education of the jury is a judicial function, best 
accomplished through instruction, rather than one to be 
delegated to an expert who would, in fact, merely lecture the 
jury. Second, the Court is concerned that allowing an expert 
witness on the subject of reliability of eyewitness testimony 
would have a significant tendency to cause the jury to 
abdicate its role as fact finder. 
(R. 134). At the end of trial, the court gave the jury a comprehensive Long instruction (R. 
176-79; Addendum B). Defense counsel then used that instruction to argue the 
unreliability of the witnesses' identifications in closing argument (R. 230:263-66). 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert 
testimony that would amount to nothing more than a lecture on 
the factors generally affecting eyewitness identifications. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Dodd's 
testimony because "identification is the central issue, there is no other evidence other than 
the identification testimony linking Appellant to the crimes, [and] Appellant presented an 
alibi defense." Aplt. Br. at 22, 25. 
2
 Although defendant stated in his notice of intent that Dr. Dodd would "make an 
evaluation and prepare a report" as soon as he received "copies of line-up photographs to 
be provided by the state," no report was ever entered into the record (R. 64). 
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In State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, this Court addressed 
whether lecture expert testimony, such as that at issue here, must be admitted despite the 
presence of a comprehensive Long instruction. This Court held that Utah precedent does 
not require such a result: 
Because of the inherent deficiencies in eyewitness 
identification recognized in Long, trial courts are required to 
give a cautionary jury instruction when eyewitness 
identification 'is a central issue in a case and such an 
instruction is required by the defense.' However, as the Utah 
Court of Appeals correctly noted in State v. Kinsey[, 979 P.2d 
424, 427 (Utah App. 1990)], this court has not extended the 
cautionary instruction requirement to include additional 
expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification. 
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, at f^ 42 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).3 
3The majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have similarly concluded that 
expert testimony is not necessary where a jury instruction concerning the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications is given. See State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1116 (Conn. 
1999); McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 372 (Fla. 1998); People v. Tisdel, 739 N.E.2d 
31, 43 (111. App. 2000); State v. Gaines, 926 P.2d 641, 647-49 (Kan. 1996); 
Commonwealth v. KentK., 696 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Mass. 1998); People v. Carson, 553 
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mich. App. 1996); State v. NMNMiles, 585 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Minn. 1998); 
State v. Whitmill, 780 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); State v. Calia, 514 P.2d 1354, 
1356 (Ore. App. 1973); State v. Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831, 837-38 (Tenn. 2000). Cf. Johnson 
v. State, 526 S.E.2d 549, 552-53, 555 & n.6 (Ga. 2000); State v. Alger, 764 P.2d 119, 127 
(Idaho App. 1989); State v. Robinson, 754 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. 2000); State v. Long, 
575 A.2d 435, 463 (N.J. 1990); State v. Brannon, 533 S.E.2d 345, 347 (S. C. App. 2000); 
State v. Wilson, 508 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Wis. App. 1993); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 
1095, 1107 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 527 U.S. 1029 (1999); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 
1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997). 
A notable exception is the case cited by defendant, United States v. Smithers, 212 
F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000). However, that case involved two witnesses who identified 
defendant at trial despite being unable to pick him out of a photo lineup two days after the 
crime. Id. at 309. The Sixth Circuit was also disturbed by the trial court's ruling that 
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Thus, a trial court's exclusion of testimony based on its determination that the 
testimony " would amount to a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the 
evidence . . 'is not an abuse of discretion'" unless defendant can show '"that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict.'" Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, at J 59 (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56, 61 (Utah 1982)); see also Ex Parte Williams, 594 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. 1992) 
(upholding exclusion where expert was not familiar with facts of the case and had no 
personal contact with witness); State v. Suddreth, 412 S.E.2d 126, 133 (N.C. App. 1992) 
(same). Cf. People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1165 (111. 1990) (upholding exclusion of 
eyewitness expert where opinion "is based on statistical averages. The eyewitness in a 
particular case may well not fit within the spectrum of these averages."); State v. Trevino, 
432 N.W.2d 503, 520 (Neb. 1988) (same). 
Here, the trial court found that Dr. Dodd's testimony "would, in fact, merely 
lecture the jury" (R. 134). The record supports the trial court's finding. Both in his 
supporting memorandum and at oral argument, defendant stated that the purpose of the 
expert testimony was to "outline for the jury the general principles of psychological 
knowledge which illuminate the problems of eyewitness performance" and "properly 
educate the jury . . . on mistakes that can be made in eyewitness identification" (R. 94; R. 
"'I'm also interested in seeing what a jury will do absent that expert testimony. It makes 
it a more interesting case. I recognize it's the defendant's fate that's at stake, but you can 
always argue for a new trial if he's convicted.'" Id. at 310. 
10 
240:15). The record does not indicate that Dr. Dodd was familiar with either the facts of 
this case or the eyewitnesses involved. 
Under Butterfield, then, the trial court's decision was an abuse of discretion only if 
defendant can show "that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict.'" Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, at f 43 (quoting 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 61). 
Defendant has made no such showing here. First, although he argues that "[t]he 
use of a cautionary instruction does not fully address the concerns regarding the fallibility 
of eyewitness identification and does not provide a substitute for expert testimony," Aplt. 
Br. at 11, he at no point explains why this is so. Cf. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, at f 44 
(concluding defendant had made no showing of prejudice "especially considering the fact 
that the jurors in this case were presented with a cautionary instruction that met the 
requirements of Long, adequately and thoroughly explaining how to evaluate eyewitness 
identifications presented at trial"). 
Second, defendant's assertion that the expert testimony was necessary because the 
eyewitness testimony was the only evidence linking him to the crime is unpersuasive. 
Although it is true that defendant's conviction rested solely on identification testimony, it 
did not rest solely on one witness or on witnesses whose identifications were varied and 
inconsistent. Two different witnesses consistently identified defendant as the man who 
had forced his way into Jeff Gunderson's apartment on the night of the crime. Both Jeff 
11 
and Cheryl Moss independently provided police with similar descriptions of defendant on 
the night of the crime; independently picked defendant out of a photo-lineup a few weeks 
later; and positively identified defendant at both the preliminary hearing and at trial (R. 
229: 98-100, 143, 160-61). A third witness also identified defendant at trial (R. 229:120). 
Even if defendant's expert could have successfully challenged one of those 
witnesses' identifications, it is unlikely that his testimony would have undermined all 
three. Cf. Reed v. State, 687 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. App. 1997) (noting number of 
witnesses is relevant factor in determining whether court must provide funding for expert 
on eyewitness identification); White v. State, 926 P.2d 291, 292 (Nev. 1996) (noting 
number of witnesses and strength of their identifications was relevant factor); Rodriguez 
v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 724, 725 (Va. App. 1995) (noting eyewitnesses may serve 
as corroborating evidence for each other). See also cases cited by defendant, State v. 
Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223 (Ariz. 1983) (finding error in excluding expert testimony 
where eyewitnesses were inconsistent and unsure of their identification); People v. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 1984) (in bank) (finding error in excluding expert 
testimony where "seven eyewitnesses . . . identified defendant as [the perpetrator] with 
varying degrees of certainty and one . . . categorically testified that defendant was not the 
[perpetrator]"). 
Thus, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's 
ruling even if it were erroneous. Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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II. THE PHOTO LINEUP WAS NOT IMPERMISSIBLY SUGGESTIVE 
WHERE FIVE OF THE SIX PHOTOS MATCHED THE 
PERPETRATOR'S DESCRIPTION, AND NOTHING WAS DONE 
TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON DEFENDANT'S PHOTO 
Defendant claims that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the photo 
identification violated his due process rights under the federal constitution. Aplt. Br. at 
38. Specifically, he argues that the photo lineup "was impermissibly suggestive . . . 
because the witnesses' attention was improperly focused on [his] photograph." Id. 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court "defer[s] to 
the trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's decision . . . and by reversing its factual findings only if they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
However, whether those facts are sufficient to support the trial court's legal conclusions 
presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. Id. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence concerning a photo 
lineup at which Jeff Gunderson and Cheryl Moss independently identified defendant as 
the perpetrator (R. 43-44). Defendant requested an evidentiary hearing to "determine 
whether the photo array itself and the means by which it was presented was unduly 
suggestive, and if so, whether that unreliable identification tainted any subsequent 
identification so that there was no independent foundation upon which it could be made" 
(R. 44-45). 
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At the hearing, Officer Karl Craig Merino was the sole witness called and 
provided the following testimony: 
As part of his investigation into the January incident, Merino interviewed both Jeff 
Gunderson and Cheryl Moss (R. 228: 6, 10). At that time, Jeff told Merino that the 
perpetrator, a man who identified himself as "Six Nine," was a muscular, medium 
complected black man approximately "six foot nine inches" tall who sported "a light 
mustache and goatee" (R. 228:7, 9, 32). Cheryl gave Merino "roughly the same 
description" (R. 228:10, 32). 
Based on this information, Merino contacted personnel at the Salt Lake County jail 
to determine whether they were familiar with anyone using the name "Six-Nine" (R. 
228:10). Merino was told that defendant used that name (R. 228:10). Merino then pulled 
a mug photo of defendant and, upon determining that the photo matched the descriptions 
given by Jeff and Cheryl, prepared a photo lineup of black men having similar facial 
features (R. 228:10-11). Because Jeff had indicated that the perpetrator was wearing a 
hat at the time, Merino "didn't view the hair, the actual hair style as critical because it 
wasn't seen" (R. 228:46). 
Along with defendant's photo, the lineup contained five other photos chosen from 
about seventy-five mug shots of black men on record (R. 228:12, 46). Although differing 
slightly in complexion in part because of the lighting, five of the persons chosen shared 
the facial features described by Jeff and Cheryl (R. 228:12, 35, 48; St. Exh. 1-6). In 
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particular, each had a similar skin tone and each had a mustache and goatee or beard, 
although some of the persons' facial hair was darker and fuller than others (R. 228:12, 34-
35, 48; St. Exh. 1-6). 
One of the men depicted was significantly heavier than the rest and possibly of 
Pacific Islander descent; however Jeff had not given Merino any information concerning 
the perpetrator's weight (R. 228:34, 37, 38, 47; St. Exh. 5). Another, according to 
defense counsel, appeared Hispanic (R. 228:47). However, each of the persons depicted 
was classified as black under the jail system (R. 228: 39, 46). 
On February 15, approximately three weeks after the crime, Merino met Jeff and 
Cheryl at their home in broad daylight to conduct the photo lineup (R. 228:16, 42). Jeff 
looked at the photos first, while Cheryl stood beyond viewing distance (R. 228:16). 
When Jeff was done, he left and Cheryl viewed the photos (R. 228:17-18). 
In each case, Merino arranged the photos to ensure that defendant's was neither 
the first nor the last in the group (R. 228:14, 33). He then explained to each witness that 
the suspect "may or may not be in the stack"; that the hair and facial hair "may be 
different"; and that the witness was "under no pressure to identify anybody" (R. 228:15, 
26, 28). Then, after giving the photos to the witness, Merino stepped back "half a step or 
s o , . . . , hands to the side or folded or crossed," and let the witness look through them (R. 
228:17, 20). Merino never did anything to draw either Jeffs or Cheryl's attention to any 
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particular photo (R. 228:17-18; 21). None of the photos, when shown to the witnesses, 
displayed any identifying information about the persons depicted (R. 228:13). 
Jeff "instantly" identified defendant as the perpetrator (R. 228:16-17). "He just 
said he's positive" (R. 228:18). Merino then asked Jeff to sign the back of defendant's 
photo and, after telling Jeff not to say anything to Cheryl, asked him to send Cheryl over 
(R. 228:19). Cheryl then looked through the stack and also "right away picked 
[defendant's] photo as the suspect" (R. 228:20-21). She too signed the back of 
defendant's photo (R. 228:21). 
Based on this evidence, the trial court found: 
(1) "that Detective Merino conducted this photo lineup quite scrupulously and 
without any conduct that would, in any way, influence either of the 
witnesses in their identification"; 
(2) that "[t]his was a well selected and well presented photo lineup" with "the 
possible exception of number five," the larger, lighter complected man; that 
"four [of the photos] are clearly Black on their face and within a quite 
acceptable range"; and that "[t]here is one that is a little closer and one that, 
at first glance, I wouldn't think he was Black"; 
(3) that "there are four or five who are Black in appearance and generally 
within the perimeters of the appearance of the defendant" 
(R. 60; R. 228:56-57). Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that five of the 
photos "are sufficient and present faces, characteristics, hair color that would make this 
far from an overly suggestive or suggestive photo array" (R. 60; R. 228:57). 
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B. Because defendant does not marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, this Court should 
refuse to consider his claim. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the photo lineup was not 
impermissibly suggestive. Aplt. Br. at 38. However, he does not claim that the trial 
court's ruling is unsupported by its factual findings. See id. Instead, he reargues the 
evidence on which those findings are based. See id. 
"To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the defendant 'must 
first marshal all the evidence that supports the trial courts findings'" and then "show that, 
even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings.'" State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 
60, f 60, 425 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 
1108) (emphasis omitted). 
Here, defendant does not even acknowledge the trial court's findings, let alone 
marshal the evidence supporting them. See Aplt. Br. at 38-43. Therefore, defendant has 
failed to meet his marshaling burden, and this Court should reject his challenge to the trial 
court's ruling. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, atf 41. 
C. The photo lineup was exemplary: five of the six photos 
depicted black men whose skin tone and facial features 
matched the description of the perpetrator, and nothing 
drew attention to defendant's photo. 
In determine whether a photo lineup is impermissibly suggestive under the federal 
due process clause, courts apply a two-part test. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 
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(Utah 1994). First, the court must determine "whether the 'pretrial photographic 
identification procedure used . . . was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" Id. (quoting State v. Thamer, 111 
P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989)). Then, if the lineup was impermissibly suggestive, the court 
must determine whether there is an "untainted, independent foundation" for any 
subsequent in-court identification. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111. 
In this case, the trial court did not reach the second part of the test because it 
concluded that the photo lineup was not unduly suggestive (R. 60; R. 228:56-57). The 
record supports the trial court's ruling. 
In determining whether a photo lineup is impermissibly suggestive, "the main 
question is whether the photo array emphasized the defendant's photo over the others." 
Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111. Factors relevant to that determination include "whether the 
words and body language of the police officers who presented the array conveyed an 
attitude of disinterest, whether the officers manipulated the photos to indicate their belief 
that one of the photos portrayed the perpetrator, and whether the photos themselves were 
selected so that the defendant's photo stood out from the rest." Id. at 1111-12. 
Here, Officer Merino's "words and body language . . . conveyed an attitude of 
disinterest." Lopez, 886 P.2d at 111. He specifically told both Jeff and Cheryl before 
they examined the photos that the person they were looking for "may or may not be in the 
stack" (R. 228:15, 26). In addition, he specifically told them that they were "under no 
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pressure to identify anybody" (R. 228:15, 26). Finally, after handing the photos to each of 
them, Officer Merino stepped back "half a step or s o , . . . , hands to the side or folded or 
crossed," and let the witness look through them (R. 228:17, 20). 
In addition, before presenting the photos to either witness, Officer Merino made 
sure to place defendant's photo into the middle of stack, so that his photo would not be 
emphasized over any other (R. 228:14). By pre-arranging the photos in this manner and 
then telling the witnesses that the perpetrator may or may not be one of the people 
depicted, Merino ensured that the presentation of the photos did nothing "to indicate [his] 
belief that one of the photos portrayed the perpetrator." Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1112. 
Finally, Merino's testimony makes clear that the photos were not purposefully 
selected "so that . . . defendant's photo stood out from the rest." Id. Merino began the 
process by first contacting personnel at the Salt Lake County jail to determine whether 
they were familiar with anyone using the name "Six-Nine" (R. 228:10). Upon learning 
that defendant used that name, Merino pulled defendant's mug photo and determined that 
the photo matched the descriptions of the perpetrator given by Jeff and Cheryl (R. 228:10-
11). He then went through the seventy-five photos of black men contained in his office's 
photo bank to find five other people who looked similar to defendant and matched the 
descriptions given by Jeff and Cheryl (R. 228:10-12, 35, 48; St. Exh. 1-6). In choosing 
which photos to use, Merino indicated that he tried to make sure that the people did not 
"all look alike" but "are similar" (R. 228:38). 
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Merino focused on skin tone and facial hair because it was difficult to tell a 
person's build from a photo of their face and neither Jeff nor Cheryl had given any 
indication whether the perpetrator's face was slim or round (R. 228:11-12, 32, 37). 
Because Jeff had indicated that the perpetrator was wearing a hat, Merino "didn't view 
the hair, the actual hair style as critical because it wasn't seen" (R. 228:46). Thus, Merino 
looked for people with a medium skin tone who had a mustache and a goatee or beard (R. 
228:12, 37). He compensated for any slight differences in facial hair by specifically 
telling Jeff and Cheryl before they looked at the photos to remember that the facial hair 
might be different (R. 228:15, 26). 
As defense counsel herself acknowledged, "medium can be anywhere from pretty 
light African American or darker African American" (R. 228:35). Thus, not surprisingly, 
each of the men in the photos had a skin tone slightly lighter or darker than the others (R. 
228:12, 35, 48). Even then, some of the difference was due not so much to differences in 
complexion but to different lighting at the time the photos were taken (R. 228:12, 35,48). 
This evidence supports the trial court's findings and conclusion that "[t]his was a 
well selected and well presented photo lineup" and that five of the photos were "sufficient 
and present faces, characteristics, hair color that would make this far from an overly 
suggestive or suggestive photo array" (R. 60; R. 228:56-57). Thus, the photo 
identification procedure used here was not "'so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to 
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a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" Lopez, 886 P.2d at 111 
(quoting Thamer, 111 P.2d at 435)). 
Consequently, defendant's challenge to the photo lineup fails on the merits. 
III. THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED WHERE THE WITNESSES COULD 
CLEARLY SEE THE PERPETRATOR'S FACE ON THE NIGHT OF 
THE CRIME AND CONSISTENTLY IDENTIFIED DEFENDANT AS 
THE PERPETRATOR THEREAFTER 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated his due process rights under the Utah 
constitution because the eyewitness identification testimony admitted in this case was 
unreliable. Aplt. Br. at 26. Because defendant invited any error on the trial court's part, 
this Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim. In any case, the claim fails on the 
merits. 
A. Defendant waived this claim by failing to pursue it below despite 
the trial court's invitation to do so. 
This Court has "'held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'" 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted)). Thus, "if a party through counsel has made 
a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error, [this 
Court] will then decline to save that party from the error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
158 (Utah 1989). 
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Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging that admission of the 
photo lineup and subsequent identifications of defendant violated his "right to federal and 
state due process" (R. 43). He requested an evidentiary hearing to "determine whether 
the photo array itself and the means by which it was presented was unduly suggestive, 
and if so, whether that unreliable identification tainted any subsequent identification so 
that there was no independent foundation upon which it could be made" (R. 44-45) 
(emphasis added). 
At the suppression hearing, the State called Officer Karl Merino to testify as to the 
suggestiveness of the photo lineup (R. 228:4). After argument, the trial court ruled that 
the photo lineup was not unduly suggestive under the federal constitution and thus denied 
that part of defendant's motion (R. 228:57). The court then asked: "Ms. Ames, anything 
further on the identification that you want to address independent of the photo array?" (R. 
228:57). Counsel responded, "No, Your Honor" (R. 228:57). Thus, defendant made a 
conscious decision to refrain from pursuing his state constitutional claim below. 
Because defendant "[is] not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and 
the benefit of objecting on appeal," Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159, this Court should refuse to 
consider his claim now. 
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B. The identification testimony was reliable where the witnesses 
viewed the perpetrator's uncovered face in a well-lit room over a 
period of several minutes and consistently identified defendant 
as the perpetrator thereafter. 
Because defendant did not pursue this claim below, it should be reviewed, if at all, 
only for plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) an error 
occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) defendant 
would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
"The ultimate question" in determining whether eyewitness identification 
testimony is admissible under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution "is whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable." State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). Factors relevant to that determination include: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. 
Id. at 781; State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, % 18, 20 P.3d 265; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 
f 42, 993 P.2d 837, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). 
Considering those factors here, the trial court committed no error in admitting the 
eyewitness identification testimony. 
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Opportunity to view the actor during the event. Pertinent circumstances under 
this factor "include the length of time the witness viewed the actor"; "the distance 
between [them]"; "whether the witness could view the actor's face"; the level of lighting; 
"whether there were distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other 
circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the actor." Ramirez, 817 
P.2dat782. 
Here, Jeff testified that the whole event lasted between ten and fifteen minutes (R. 
229:139). Cheryl testified that once she came out of the bedroom she was in defendant's 
presence for three to five minutes (R. R. 227:47; R. 229:102). At their initial contact, Jeff 
was close enough to defendant to be able to place his hand on defendant's chest (R. 
227:7; R. 229:131-32). Cheryl testified that when defendant first looked at her, he was 
about eight feet away (R. 229:87). Ayza testified that he saw defendant "face to face" 
from about four feet away (R. 229:118-19). Defendant wore nothing over his face; thus, 
the witnesses' view of his face was unobstructed (R. 227:31; R. 228:8). Although the 
event occurred at night, both Cheryl and Ayza testified that the room was well-lit (R. 
229:84, 118). Outside of the initial shooting of Jeff in the leg, no one testified to any 
distracting noises or activity during the period. 
Witnesses' degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event The 
testimony of all three eyewitnesses indicates that they were aware that a robbery was 
taking place and that they were attentive to defendant's actions. Although both Cheryl 
24 
and Ayza testified that they avoided looking directly at defendant after a point, both Jeff 
and Cheryl were able to describe the perpetrator's height, build, complexion, and facial 
hair on the night of the crime (R. 229:102, 126). Ayza was apparently not asked to give a 
description. 
Witnesses9 capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity. "Here, relevant circumstances include whether the witness's capacity to 
observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal 
motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, 
drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. As their testimony reflects, none of the 
witnesses were so impaired by stress or fright during the event that they could not 
perceive what was going on. Despite Jeffs and Ayza's admissions that they had been 
smoking marijuana for several hours, each witness gave a detailed description of what 
was happening around them on that night. (R. 227:21-23; R. 229:120, 140). Cheryl was 
not under the influence of either drugs or alcohol that night and had not been for some 
time (R. 229:101). In addition, although Jeff was shot during the crime, the officer who 
interviewed him later that night stated that he was alert and understood the officer's 
questions (R. R. 229:189-90). Finally, nothing in the record indicates any personal 
motivations or biases, or any uncorrected visual impairments. 
Whether the witnesses' identifications were made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter. Here, relevant circumstances include the length of time 
25 
between the event and the identification of defendant; the witness's mental state at the 
time of the identification; the witness's exposure to information from other sources; 
whether the witness, or any other witness, has ever failed to identify defendant or gave 
inconsistent descriptions; and the circumstances under which defendant was identified. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2dat 783. 
In this case, both Jeff and Cheryl gave similar descriptions of the perpetrator to 
police on the night of the crime (R. 227:28-29; 34, 47-48; R. 229:98, 185, 190). The two 
gave the same description to Officer Merino two weeks later (R. 228:6-7, 10; R. 
229:164). They then independently identified defendant out of a non-suggestive photo 
lineup three weeks after the crime occurred (R. 228:16, 20; R. 229:164, 170-71). They 
positively identified defendant both at the preliminary hearing and at trial (R. 227:8, 52; 
R. 229:84, 144, 160). Although Cheryl did at one point discuss the perpetrator with 
neighbors, she had already given a description to the police by that time; moreover, the 
only information she gained from them was about defendant's height (R. 227:44-47). 
The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly.. "This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. Nothing in the record supports the proposition that this was an 
ordinary event for these witnesses. Moreover, although the perpetrator was black, Jeffs 
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and Cheryl's ability to pick defendant out of a photo lineup suggests that they were able 
to distinguish between black men based on their facial features (R. 229:98-100, 112). 
Under this totality of circumstances, the witnesses' testimony "met the threshold 
test for constitutional reliability." Hoffnine, 2001 UT 4, at f 19 (holding evidence 
admissible where, despite it being dark and the incident happening "very quickly," the 
witness was able to describe the perpetrator and then during a showup of two people 
shortly thereafter indicate that defendant looked more like the perpetrator than the other 
person); see also Decorso, 1999 UT 57, at f 47 (holding evidence admissible despite 
witness's exposure to photographs of defendant prior to the lineup and being told by 
reporter that he was a suspect where defendant did not wear mask, witness testified her 
fear did not distract her, and her description of defendant remained consistent); Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 784 (holding evidence admissible despite "[t]he blatant suggestiveness of the 
showup" and inconsistencies in witnesses' descriptions where gunman was wearing mask 
over lower part of face; lighting was poor to good; witness, though injured, viewed 
gunman for few seconds to minute or longer from distance often feet). 
Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the witnesses' testimony at trial, and 
defendant's plain error claim fails. 
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IV. DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
AT SIDEBAR JURY VOIR DIRE; HE SIMPLY FAILED TO 
EXERCISE IT 
Defendant claims that, by holding sidebar conferences with some of the 
venirepersons out of his presence, the trial court violated his right to be present under 
article 1, section 12 of the Utah constitution and under section 77-1-6 (1995) of the Utah 
Code. Aplt. Br. at 45. Because defendant did not raise this claim below, it is reviewed 
only for plain error. See Aplt. Br. at 50. To establish plain error, defendant must 
demonstrate that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (3) defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
A. Proceedings below. 
During jury voir dire, the trial court held a total often side-beir conferences during 
which the court and counsel conducted off-the-record questioning of nine different 
venirepersons (R. 229:30-32; R. 229:32-33; R. 229:35-36; R. 229:40-41; R. 229:41; R. 
229:41; R. 229:42; R. 229:43-44; R. 229:45; R. 229:63). After several of the sidebars, 
defense counsel confirmed that she had uask[ed] whatever questions you wanted to ask of 
the Prospective Juror in private" (R. 229:32, 43, 45). At no point did defendant or his 
counsel object to this procedure. 
Toward the end of voir dire, the trial court invited both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor to ask on the record any follow-up questions "relating to the matters that the 
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court has discussed with [jurors] at the bench" (R. 229:53). Upon completion of voir 
dire, defendant, through counsel, passed the jury for cause (R. 229:68). After the jurors 
were named, defendant, through counsel, accepted the jury as constituted (R. 229:70). 
Of the nine jurors with whom sidebars were held, only two, Emanuel Spencer and 
Paula Vernon, sat on the jury that convicted defendant (R. 144, 145). Defendant never 
challenged either juror for cause or peremptorily. 
B. Absent a firmly established and universally accepted rule 
of law, plain error cannot be established by reliance on 
state cases from outside of Utah, 
Defendant asserts that "there is no case law in Utah bearing directly on the issue of 
whether side-bar voir dire[] conducted outside the presence of the defendant violated his 
statutory and constitutional rights." Aplt. Br. at 46. Thus, defendant cites to cases from 
New York, North Carolina, and West Virginia to support his argument. Aplt. Br. at 46. 
Utah appellate courts have consistently held that a trial court cannot commit 
obvious error until there is settled appellate law or a universally accepted rule on the 
issue. State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly 
held that a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide 
the trial court.") (citing State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 1989); State v. Braun, 
787 P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah App. 1990)); see also State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 
(Utah 1992); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App. 1998). 
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Caselaw from three jurisdictions outside of Utah does not establish settled 
appellate law or a universally accepted rule. Thus, defendant cannot establish plain error. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
C. Defendant waived his right to be present at the sidebar by 
failing to assert it at the time. 
While Utah lacks a swell of case law on a defendant's right to be present during 
criminal proceedings, this Court's decision in State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982) 
(per curiam), and the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 
(1985) (per curiam), demonstrate the absence of plain error in this case. 
"Utah Constitution article I, section 12 guarantees the right of an accused to appear 
and defend in person against any cause against him." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 
1109-10 (Utah 1996). Thus, a defendant has a right "to be present in his own person 
whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge."' State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 
1992) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934); citing United States 
v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam)).4 
However, "'[i]t is not only the right of the defendant to be present, but is a duty 
which the [law] imposes upon him.'" Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (quoting State v. 
4As in this case, the defendant in Burk raised a state constitutional claim but failed 
to provide any independent analysis to support it; thus, the court of appeals addressed 
Burk's claim only under the federal constitution. Burk, 839 P.2d at 886 n.6. 
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Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 514, 51 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1935)). Thus, a defendant may waive the 
right by his own inaction. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (holding defendant waived 
right to be present at sentencing when, after waiving presence at trial, defendant failed to 
keep in touch with pre-trial services and attorney as to date of sentencing hearing). 
In State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982) (per curiam), the defendant was 
removed prior to jury voir dire because he was "so intoxicated . . . that it would have been 
detrimental to his own interests to be present." This Court found no constitutional 
violation of the defendant's right to be present where "[n]o motion for a continuance had 
been made prior to the selection of the jury, and defendant's absence at the selection was 
not noted as a reason for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, nor was any showing offered 
specifically to demonstrate that defendant's absence was other than voluntary." Id. 
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 
522 (1985) (per curiam). During that trial, the bailiff informed the court that a juror was 
concerned because he had noticed the defendant sketching portraits of the jurors. Id. at 
523. The trial court then announced, "still in open court in the presence of... 
[defendant] and his counsel: 'I will talk to the juror in my chambers and make a 
determination.'" Id. The juror and defendant's counsel then retreated with the judge to 
his chambers. Id. at 524. At no time did defendant objection to the in camera proceeding 
or move for the juror's disqualification. Id. He filed no post-trial motion challenging the 
trial court's action. Id. 
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Under these facts, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had waived his right 
to be present at the in camera proceedings: "[Fjailure by a criminal defendant to invoke 
his right to be present... at a conference which he knows is taking place between the 
judge and a juror in chambers constitutes a valid waiver of that right." Gagnon, 470 U.S. 
at 529; see also United States v. Brown, 923 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding 
defendant waived right to presence at in camera discussion with jurors where counsel 
attended and defendant "did nothing in the district court by way of request, objection, or 
motion to assert any rights [he] may have had to attend"). 
In this case, defendant was present in the courtroom when the trial court met with 
the venirepersons at the bench (R. 229:41, 44). Defendant "did nothing in the [trial] court 
by way of request, objection, or motion" to assert his right to attend those meetings. 
Brown, 923 F.2d at 112. He therefore waived any right he had to be present at them. 
Glenny, 656 P.2d at 992; Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 529; Brown, 923 F.2d at 112; see also 
Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 662 (Wyo. 2000) (finding waiver under similar facts 
where defendant's "presence in the courtroom [when the sidebar jury voir dire was held] 
permitted either her or defense counsel to object to her exclusion; however, both were 
silent"). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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D. Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced 
by his absence. 
Even if defendant did not waive his right to be present by his silence, he must still 
demonstrate prejudice to succeed on his plain error claim. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208-09 (holding that defendant must show prejudice to establish plain error claim). 
Cf. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (holding that "'a showing of prejudice is necessary to 
uphold a due process challenge against an in absentia proceeding'") (quoting Dasher v. 
Stripling, 685 F.2d 385, 387-88 (11th Cir. 1982)). Defendant has not shown prejudice 
here. 
Dispositive is the fact that defendant raises no claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. 
Specifically, defendant does not challenge counsel's decision to keep Mr. Spencer and 
Ms. Vernon on the jury panel. "[T]rial counsel's lack of objection to, or failure to 
remove, a particular juror is presumed to be the product of a conscious choice or 
preference." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 20, 12 P.3d 92. In addition, "because 
the process of jury selection is a highly subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process, trial 
counsel's presumably conscious and strategic choice to refrain from removing a particular 
juror is further presumed to constitute effective representation." Id. 
Because defendant presents no argument to overcome these presumptions, he 
cannot show that his absence from the sidebars "[had] a relation, reasonably substantial, 
to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Burk, 839 P.2d at 887 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. State v. Taylor, 676 N.E.2d 82, 93 
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(Ohio 1997) (citing "the Snyder principle that an accused's absence from a hearing at 
which counsel were present does not necessarily offend due process"). 
Thus, even if defendant did not waive his right to be present, he has not 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his absence. Consequently, his plain error claim 
fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED &_ August 2001. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM "A" 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ADDENDUM "B" 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 o>~ 
One of the most important questions in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the person who committed the 
crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was committed, but also 
that the defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, 
after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you 
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the identification 
witness was insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in 
his/her belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you 
should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor? In answering this question, you should 
consider: 
a) the length of time the witnesses observed the actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible 
and undisguised; 
(cont.) 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
e) the presence or absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness' 
opportunity to observe the person committing the 
crime. 
2. Did the witnesses have the capacity to observe the 
person committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether 
the witness' capacity was impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
You should also consider whether the witness is of a 
different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a person 
of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a 
person of the same race. 
3. Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the 
criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether 
the witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time 
he/she observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate 
opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal act, he/she may 
not have done so unless he/she was aware that a crime was being 
committed. 
(cont.) 
4- Was the witness' identification of the defendant 
completely the product of his own memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the witness' 
original observation and his identification of the 
defendant; 
b) the witness' capacity and state of mind at the time 
of the identification; 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions of 
identifications given by other witnesses, to photographs 
or newspaper accounts, or to any other information or 
influence that may have affected the independence of 
his/her identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, failed to identify the defendant; 
e) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made 
from seeing the person are generally more reliable than 
identification made from a photograph. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime is on the 
prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you have heard 
from the prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the 
(cont.) 
eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty. 
